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by Stephen Baier 
Saharan history should take account of events at two levels, first the ebb 
and flow in the lives of Saharan nomads and inhabitants of oases - seasonal 
migration to and from pasture, the formation of new alliances and the breakup 
of others, the rise and fall of leaders, the story of raid and counter-raid, 
the epics of gallant warriors and noble women, and the life and times of 
merchants, holy men, and scholars, Superimposed over these local histories is 
the second level, with its larger pattern of historical change. In the 
nineteenth century the Sahara, remote though it was, came into increasingly 
close contact with the world economy. By the close of the century European 
economic penetration had affected the lives of many people, and the European 
conquest of the desert, though far from complete, had produced fundamental 
change in the nature of relationships between the Sahara and the outside world. 
The paucity of data for history at either level presents both problems and 
challenges and points to the need for research in Ottoman, French, Italian, 
Egyptian, and Moroccan avchives and in private collections. By the nineteenth 
century European sources provide data to give some notion of historical 
processes. All written accounts, whether in European languages, Turkish, or 
Arabic, need to be filled out with oral histories, which have been undertaken 
only in a piecemeal fashion. For example, the Tuareg of the Central Sahara 
have been well researched, but for other groups very little historical ma-
terial exists, In some Saharan societies the lack of depth in genealogies and 
the absence of local Arabic historical writings present the historian with 
problems which may never be solved. 
This chapter will survey the history of the Sahara in the nineteenth 
century by focusing on the camel nomads, the inhabitants of the desert who 
lived from their herds. In good times wealth in camels conferred awesome 
military power on their owners by giving them the ability to mount lightning 
raids on oasis dwellers amd sedentary agriculturalists, and then to escape 
into the wilderness with impunity. This military advantage allowed them to 
raid for slaves, as they often did along the southern shore of the desert, the 
Sahel; or to dominate sedentary agriculturalists living in oases or in the 
Sahel by demanding tribute in return for protection. Although nomads could 
enslave, destroy date palms or standing crops, steal grain stores, and disrupt 
trade, more often their goal was to control and appropriate the production of 
agriculturalists, not to annihilate them. The nomads are therefore the proper 
focus for much social and economic history, as well as key actors in politi-
cal, military, and religious change. 
I. Society and Environment 
Pastoral nomadism is of course a complete adaptation to the arid environ-
ment of the desert. The word desert, as defined by low rainfall, implies a 
deceptively simple framework, but in reality there exists a rich variety of 
climate and landform which has shaped the societies of the Sahara, 
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At the risk of simplification the desert is subject to two rainfall 
regimes, with the southern desert receiving precipitation in the summer and 
the northern desert in the winter, and some overlap of the two along the 
Atlantic coast. Little rain falls, and what does is extremely unevenly 
distributed in time and space, so that in the most arid parts of the desert 
some locations may not have rain for ten years or more. The Sahara is driest 
in the central portions and especially in the eastern central desert, in 
present-day Egypt and eastern Libya. Three "bridges" of higher than average 
rainfall traverse the central, dry portions from north to south, the first 
joining Senegal to Morocco slightly inland from the drier Atlantic coast, the 
second connecting the Niger bend to Algeria, and the third following the high 
ground bordering on the Red Sea. Not surprisingly population is concentrated 
in relatively well watered portions of the desert, and caravaneers have 
usually avoided the most arid regions of Egypt and Libya. Precipitation 
increases with altitude up to a certain height, and Saharan land form has as 
many nuances as climate. After rains formerly dry river beds or wadi may flow 
for hundreds of miles, and for great distances just under the surface of the 
sand. In some cases irrigated agriculture is possible because of the high 
water table. In areas of dunes called ergs the sand itself holds great 
quantities of moisture; dunes absorb almost all rainfall and give off very 
little water to underground aquifers. In addition the sand loses moisture to 
the atmosphere very slowly, since drifting exposes only the windward surface 
of the dunes.l 
Herders and their animals can live in the desert only if they move from 
place to place to take advantage of scattered and short-lived pasture. But in 
the desert fringes a variety of human adaptations to the environment are 
possible, including various degrees of dependence on agriculture and various 
mixes of animals in the herds. In the Sahel cattle nomads lived in symbiotic 
relationships with sedentary agriculturalists, and some camel nomads divided 
the labor of their families between herding and farming. Others sacrificed 
crop yields to the need of the herds by sowing crops, leaving with the herds 
to search for pasture, and returnig to harvest the meagre returns of the 
fields. In the central, dry parts of the desert, nomadic pastoral is ts kept 
several species of animals, but they relied heavily on the camel because of 
its adaptation to aridity. Camels needed various kinds of pasture to do well 
and therefore had to be taken periodically from ergs to rocky ground (regs). 
This necessity as well as the search for pasture determined the amplitude of 
movements of camel nomads. 2 Those whose territory included adjacent areas 
of rocky and sandy ground, such as the Chaamba, migrated smaller distances 
than those without both kinds of terrain, such as the Regibat, despite other 
similarities in their respective territories. 
The arid environment has encouraged the evolution of similar decentralized 
political systems among most nomadic people, systems which balance the need 
for dispersal in search of pasture with the necessity for unified action in 
the face of an outside threat. These systems, which have been described as 
segmentary lineage systems, place each person in a series of widening and 
overlapping lineages, defined as groups of people descended from a common 
ancestor, real or putative.3 Genealogy can be used to divide the tribe into 
x number of maximal segments ( often called clans) each of which is in turn 
divided into y number of segments on down through intermediate levels to the 
minimal lineage, a group consisting of two or three generations of males 
living together, their wives, and their descendants in the male line. 
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Societies organized according to descent may resolve internal conflict without 
recourse to central authority if the power of segments at an appropriate level 
in the genealogical structure is in balance, and the history of these soci-
eties often exhibits this mechanism in operation. But history also demon-
strates that segments may unite to face an outside threat, and that military 
exigency may even give rise to something resembling central authority. 
Sedentary or semi-sedentary people have often assimilated non-kin who migrated 
to their territory, and in these societies residence in the same territory may 
replace kinship as a principle of association. Even societies which are 
organized according to descent may have leaders or councils at various levels 
in the segmentary structure or distributed throughout it; wealthy men may have 
dependent followers who are not kin --slaves, migrants, or clients -- and who, 
as time passed, were incorporated into the genealogical framework. Finally, 
alliances may contradict or partially offset the notion of kinship as a 
determinant of allegiance. 
II. Changing Relations with the Outside World 
Desert nomads lived in a world of their own, but they were not immune from 
influences from the outside. For one thing they were so specialized in animal 
husbandry that to obtain grain and other i terns they depended not only on 
plunder and tribute, but also on peaceful trade with sedentary states. 
Another factor was that their military advantage of mobility did not extend 
far beyond the desert fringe. More fertile regions supported larger popu-
lations, and these thickly settled areas could muster enough defenders to 
offset the advantage which the less numerous nomads enjoyed in their own realm. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century the style of interaction 
between nomads and sedentary states differed greatly at the northern and 
southern edge of the desert. In West and Central Africa a principal problem 
for sedentary rulers was to keep the nomads at a safe distance, a problem 
mitigated somewhat in North Africa by geographical barriers such as the Atlas 
and other mountain ranges. South of the desert the best strategy was to 
involve nomads in the economy of the fertile areas by giving them a stake in 
desert edge commerce, urban growth, and agriculture, and by using nomadic 
contingents in armies fighting other sedentary states. It was also prudent to 
follow what we know as the Chinese example of using one group of nomads as 
"hired guns" to keep others at bay. The same principles applied north of the 
desert, but in the nineteenth century the Ottoman regencies and the sultans of 
Morocco showed considerable skill in maintaining balances of power among 
nomads and sparing themselves direct confrontations.4 A principal dif-
ference was their wealth relative to sub-Saharan states, which facilitated 
ruling through favored groups and allowed North African rulers to support 
small but well-armed forces which might intervene from time to time in the 
affairs of nomads. In addition Maghribi authorities enjoyed prestige as the 
spiritual as well as temporal rulers of Muslim states, or their represen-
tatives, a status which enabled skillful or revered sultans or governors to 
use diplomacy to maximize the effect of their small armed contingents. 
The advance of the Ottomans in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and French in 
Algeria marked a turning piont in relationships between Saharan societies and 
outsiders. The French and Ottoman advance southward into the desert had 
similar timing in the early stages and derived from analagous strategic 
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considerations, namely the desire to control and tax trans-Saharan trade and 
to prevent other powers from annexing the hinterland of footholds near the 
Mediterranean. Despite the similar speed of the advance, the style of the two 
powers differed greatly. 5 Since Ottoman governors had fewer means at their 
disposal than the French and long experience with nomads, their relations with 
nomads in the hinterland of their domains in Tripoli tania and Cyrenaica were 
far more discreet and sophisticated. Their knowledge of the structure of 
local politics enabled them to exploit the changing pattern of feuds, alli-
ances, and warfare between tribes. They drew upon long experience governing 
segmentary societies and carrying on diplomatic relations with those they 
could not govern, and they were also accorded legitimacy and status as repre-
sentatives of the political center of the Muslim world. 
In 1835 the Ottomans took direct control of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica 
from the semi-autonomous Karamanli dynasty in an effort to block the inroads 
of French influence from Tunisia and Algeria and British influence from 
Egypt. A series of incidents in Ottoman efforts to extend their control of 
the desert in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica illustrates the character of their 
government. In theory a kaimakam resided in Jalo, and it was his duty to 
oversee efforts to collect taxes levied on the date palms of Jalo and Awjila 
and to maintain order in the surrounding desert. But by 1869 the kaimakam 
spent most of the time in Benghazi, and so a tax collector, who visited the 
oasis once a year, was the only regular Ottoman represenative in the interior. 
In return for the tax they paid, oasis dwellers of Awjila asked for protection 
from the nomadic Zuwaya, who were interfering with the flow of trans-Saharan 
trade and attempting to extend control over the oasis. Mason recorded an oral 
tradition telling of the visit of an Ottoman official to Awjila to make peace 
with the zuwaya, whom the the Ottomans had apparently been fighting. In 1856 
the kaimakam of Benghazi ruled through the shaikh of the Baracasa, a bedouin 
group, which he supported with fifty armed soldiers.6 The influence of the 
Qt toman government never reached very far into the Cyrenaican desert, and by 
the later decades of the century the Sanusiyya, a Muslim tariqa founded in the 
1840 1 s, had become the effective government in the interior.7 -
Even the limited ability of the Ottomans to tax date production or inter-
fere in the affairs of nomads met with resistance. The Ottoman governor Ali 
Askar, who arrived in Tripoli in 1838, encountered three resistance leaders in 
the Tripolitanian hinterland, and the experience of one of these leaders, Abd 
al-Jalil, leader of the Awlad Sulayman, a nomadic group of the Fazzan and the 
Syrte, is instructive.8 The Pasha first negotiated with Abd al-Jalil, 
recognizing him as the legitimate ruler of his domains in return for a promise 
not to disrupt trade between Tripoli and the interior. But Abd al-Jalil 
proved too powerful for ottoman purposes when he initiated contacts with 
commercial interests in Tunisia and Egypt, demonstrating that he had at least 
the potential to threaten the prosperity of Tripoli. Ali Askar used diplo-
matic contacts to discredit Abd al-Jalil in the eyes of his allies, who as 
adherents to the ideology of segmentary politics recognized the threat posed 
by a concentration of power. On three critical occasions when Abd al-Jalil 
faced Ottoman forces on the battlefield in 1840 and 1841, he was deserted and 
turned upon by former allies. In the final fight Abd al-Jalil was killed and 
his forces nearly wiped out, but the defeated Awlad Sulayman fled south along 
the caravan route from the Fazzan to Berno. Previously Abd al-Jalil had 
formed marriage alliances with important families in Berno as part of a 
strategy of building a commercial empire which . would have included 
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commercial contacts in the Sudanese kingdom. Capitalizing on these alliances, 
surviving Aw lad Sulayman took up positions on the nomadic frontier of Berno, 
where they were of use to the Bornoan ruler to block the depredations of the 
Tuareg. But in 1850 the Awlad Sulayman were soundly defeated by these nomadic 
foes. Twice in a decade they had nearly been annihilated, but they survived 
to become the scourge of trade and of neighboring nomads and agricultural 
people. They augmented their numbers by assimilating slaves taken in raids 
and by calling to their former saff allies from the Syrte and Fazzan. 
The experience of the Awlad Sulayman demonstrates that even the limited 
military resources of Ottoman Pasha of Tripoli could produce disruption among 
nomads, and it shows that the ability of the Ottomans to manipulate segmentary 
politics and shifting saff alliances was an important skill. The French, on 
the other hand, had no such advantage and relied almost entirely on the force 
of arms. The first obstacle to the expansion of the French in Algeria was the 
state formed by Abd al-Qadir, but after his surrender in 1847 they turned 
their attention toward the desert, and in the 1850's under General Randon they 
took an interest in re-establishing commercial relations between Algeria and 
the Western Sudan. To provide security for the trade they hoped to promote 
they established outposts at Geryville and Laghouat in 1852, Wargla in 1853, 
and Touggourt in 1854. In the west military expansion south of Geryville 
halted with the revel t of the Aw lad Sidi Shaikh, which lasted intermittently 
until after the turn of the century, and suffered other temporary setbacks 
with the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 and a serious uprising in the Kabilie 
Mountains in 1871. Renewed interest in trans-Saharan commerce and ill-con-
sidered plans for a trans-Saharan railway spurred further penetration into the 
desert in the 1870 • s. The southern portion of the Algerian desert remained 
beyond French control, and the advance south of Wargla was halted when Ahaggar 
Tuareg massacred most members of the second Flatters expedition in 1881, 
demonstrating that the occupation of Tuareg country could prove costly in-
deed. After 1890 the French had the tacit approval of the British for further 
central Saharan conquest, and the final phase bagan in 1899 with the occupa-
tion of In Salah. The last serious resistance was put down in 1902 with the 
defeat of the Ahaggar. By the time of these final operations the French had 
learned an important lesson about desert fighting: the solution to the almost 
impossibly long supply lines necessary for desert operations was to mount each 
soldier on a camel and require each unit to travel lightly and carry most of 
the supplies necessary for extended maneuvers. The French also turned to the 
new expedient of recruiting nomadic people en masse into their service as 
irregulars, and this allowed them to combine the mobility and local knowledge 
of nomads with the vastly superior firepower of the French army. In the 
defeat of the Ahaggar in 1902 the French took advantage of long-standing 
animosity between Chaamba and Tuareg; in the final battle a single French 
officer led a force composed entirely of well-trained and heavily-armed 
Chaamba mounted on their best camels.9 
Unlike the French the Moroccan central government, despite economic reform 
in the second half of the nineteenth century, did not have the means to 
finance an army capable of extending effective occupation beyond the Atlas 
Mountains to the pre-Saharan fringe. Nor could the Moroccans stand up to the 
French army, which exerted pressure on the frontier with Algeria and sometimes 
pursued dissident groups into Moroccan territory. The pre-Saharan fringe of 
Morocco was considered the bled es-siba, or land of dissidence, but this 
translation obscures long-standing and important economic, political, and 
social ties between siba and makhzan, the territory where the sultan could 
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collect taxes and exert his authority. Morocco enjoyed the informal protec-
tion of the British who controlled the lion's share of Moroccan import-export 
trade. In addition, Moroccan sultans took care to throw into relief existing 
political and diplomatic ties with the southeast. Even if Moroccan sultans 
could not tax or control nomadic groups beyond the Atlas, they could enter 
into local politics by throwing their weight behind one faction or another, by 
mediating disputes, or by capitalizing on their prestige as religious 
leaders.10 
The real significance of the French occupation of the Algerian desert was 
that it was a phenomenon of an entirely new order. It was far more permanent 
than the occasional expeditions of the Moroccan sultan into the desert, 
journeys the main purpose of which was to make and renew acquaintances with 
important local people. It also contrasted sharply with the infrequent visits 
of Ottomon officials to the oases of Cyrenaica and with the Ottoman policy of 
leaving the nomads to themselves except for occasional attempts to tip the 
balance in disputes between groups. For the first time nomads had to contend 
with an army of occuption armed with modern weapons and staffed with local 
guides and irregulars who knew the desert. While it would not be advisable to 
overstate the degree of control which the French actually had in the early 
years in the desert, it is necessary to point out that he French occupation of 
the desert was far more complete than sedentary states on the periphery of the 
Sahara had ever attempted. It was also very expensive, especially in relation 
to the ability of marginal land in the desert and desert fringe to produce a 
surplus. Historians have explored the impoverishment of the Muslim population 
as a result of losses of land and livestock, and the revolts which were caused 
by the French policy of cantonnement .11 It would, however, be instructive 
to assess to what extent Saharan people, as opposed to Algerians in general, 
had to pay for the occupation of the desert, but this will have to await 
further .research on the Algerian desert. 
While it is not possible to give a full account of resistance to the 
French in the Algerian Sahara, a history of this resistance would benefit from 
the framework worked out by Ross Dunn for responses to the French in the 
pre-Saharan fringe of Morocco. This conceptual framework draws attention to 
the uncertain nature of alliance groups in nomadic societies, and the extreme 
unpredictability of the French invasion. The French could destroy standing 
crops, palm plantations, irrigation works, and livestock. On the other hand 
they established conditions for permanent peace on their terms, a peace which 
might nonetheless promote expanded trade. Above all, according to Dunn, the 
arrival of the French created a new degree of uncertainty in the life of 
nomads and oasis dwellers: 
In short, their coming added to the extreme caprices of 
nature a whole new set of economic uncertainties. Con-
sequently every tribe and qsar, indeed every group, large 
or small, with shared interests and resources, was obliged 
to weigh its response to the French army against the 
effects, for better or worse, on its economic well-being. 
The crisis produced not an adjournment, but an intensifi-
cation of the struggle to outwit the environment, as 
cooperating groups and individuals sought simultaneously to 
protect their vital resources and to avoid unconditional 
submission to the advancing army.12 
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Dunn observes that the ideology of kinship could be a highly effective prin-
ciple for military unity in the face of an ephemeral outside threat. But it 
was of little value "in circumstances where survival depended essentially upon 
the ability of groups with shared resources to reconcile their politics to 
their economic interests through a fragmented, contradictory process of 
attack, compromise, and evasion. 1113 Although this conclusion is intended 
for the Dawi Mani, it might well apply to the history of many other Saharan 
societies, and Dunn's emphasis is worth remembering: 
the population of southeastern Morocco cannot be categor-
ized as either resistors or collaborators. Rather trade, 
negotiation, and collaboration went on simultaneously with 
resistance, adding up to a collective response over three 
decades that was multifarious, fluctuating, and in-
consistent. 
Unity in resistance was of course possible, even though the fluid and 
unstable character of segmentary relationships militated against it. Resis-
tance groups might coalesce around religious leaders, as in the case of the 
Awlad Sidi Shaikh, or around religious orders, as in the case of the Qadiriyya 
in the days of Abd al-Qadir.14 In another case unusual economic circum-
stances caused by the French advance brought about unity of action among 
Ahaggar Tuareg. As the Ahaggar became hemmed in on the north by the French 
advance in the 1860's, they transformed the basis of their economy. Because 
of relative stability under the leadership of the amenukal Al Hajj Akhmed 
(1830-1877), it was possible to extend cultivation in Ahaggar with the labor 
of servile agriculturaltists. The attack on the Flatters mission in 1881 
occurred during a severe drought in 1880-1883. Later, as the French occupied 
the oases of the central Sahara, Ahaggar responded by using pastures in what 
is today northwestern Niger and by caravan trade with the southern desert 
fringe. They took salt from the sebkha or salt plain at Amadror, along with 
dates and small quantities of imported British cotton goods, to Damergu, at 
the northernmost limit of sedentary agriculture on the Tripoli-Kano trade 
route north of Zinder. The unity of the Ahaggar confederation, which facili-
tated these economic adjustments, was without doubt the product of conflict 
with neighbors. In the 1870's the Ahaggar had mounted a serious challenge to 
the Ajjer Tuareg to their east and north, which was growing rich with the boom 
conditions in Tripoli-Kano trade during that decade, and they faced hostile 
Tuareg groups in other directions, such as the Oulliminden to the southwest 
and certain Air Tuareg to the southeast.15 
A full account of resistance would also call attention to the extreme 
mobility of camel nomads and their ability to migrate with their herds from 
one end of the Sahara to the other as long as they were willing to take up a 
life fraught with danger and uncertainty. A case in point is the fifty-year 
odyssey of the Djeramna, who first ran afoul of the French in 1881 near 
Geryville during the revolt of the Awlad Sidi Shaikh, an uprising sparked by 
land shortage, news of the massacre of the Flatters expedition, and the 
departure of French troops to help in the Tunisian campaign. When Bou Amama, 
the leader of the uprising, was deserted by his partisans, the Djeramna left 
to join the Ahaggar Tuareg. In 1889 they took part in a raid led by Chaamba 
on the Tripoli-Kano road south of Ghadames; somewhat later they were reported 
to have taken part in a raid in the Fazzan and another in southern Tunisia. 
With the collapse of Tuareg resistance they retreated to the Tripolitanian 
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highlands bordering on southern Tunisia and Algeria and their raids became an 
issue in territorial rivalry between the French and the Turks. In 1925, they 
finally returned to surrender at Geryville nearly fifty years after having 
left on their wanderings.16 
III. Desert Trade and the Nomads 
The industrial revolution accelerated change in European military tech-
nology in the last half of the nineteenth century, assuring that European 
forces, armed with the latest weapons, faced opponents with outdated armes. 
The industrial revolution not only reduced the cost of the conquest of the 
desert, but also transformed the economic life of the Sahara, as the manufac-
ture of cheap products permitted a new phase of European economic penetra-
tion. Trade with Europe had existed before, but the nineteenth century 
witnessed a massive increase in the scale of this trade, with varying effects 
depending on the structure of Saharan regional economies. For example, the 
cotton goods industry of Morocco, which had trans-Atlas outlets, succumbed 
after 1860 to the competition of Manchester cotton goods, while the woolen 
textile industry of southern Tunisia fared much better and continued to feed 
products into trans-Saharan networks.17 On the fringe of the Sahara various 
groups involved themselves in exports of primary products. For example north 
of the Senegal basin increased exports of gum arabic allowed a zawiya lineage, 
whose members specialized in Islamic scholarship and the mediation of disputes 
and organized trading caravans to escales on the Senegal River, to gain in 
power and influence.18 In the area north of the Sokoto Caliphate the rise 
of exports of ostrich feathers and tanned goat skins in the last thirty years 
of the century forced nomadic ruling classes to adjust to the ability of 
peasants and servile agriculturalists to earn income from collecting and 
selling these products.19 European economic penetration also affected the 
tastes of consumers, so that the custom of drinking heavily sugared tea spread 
during the century. 
A major mechanism of closer contact with the world economy was 
trans-Saharan trade, which for centuries had passed through the desert and had 
always involved Saharan people in a variety of ways. In the first place 
people of the northern oases such as Tafilalt, the Wadi Mizab, Ghadames, the 
Fazzan, Awjila, and Siwa played a pivotal role in organizing and financing 
trade. Perhaps because of the strategic location of these oases and because 
the oases relied heavily on the trade of dates for grain from zones of rain-
fall agriculture farther north, oasis dwellers, with their long histories of 
trade, moved naturally into trans-Saharan commerce over the centuries as 
opportunities opened up. Nomadic groups such as the Ahaggar and Kel Ewey 
Tuareg, the Tubu, and the Zuwaya of the central Sahara (a beduin group not to 
be confused with zawiya clerical lineages in Mauritania) traded small quanti-
ties of slaves and other products on their own account, but they could not 
match the scale of sedentary merchants from the northern oases, who had 
financial backing from middlemen in Mediterranean ports and ultimately from 
Europe, especially when prices and conditions on the routes were favorable. 
Consequently the main role of camel nomads was to provide transport animals, 
guides, and military escorts for caravans, and they also ran freight delivery 
services for merchants who were unable or preferred not to accompany cara-
vans. 20 Most groups of Saharan nomads had a major stake in the trade which 
passed through their territory: Regibat on the route to western Morcco, 
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Ait Khabbash (a segment of the Ait Atta) on the Tafilalt-Tuat road, Chaamba on 
the routes north of Tuat, Tuareg on the Tripoli-Kano route, Tubu on the 
Burnu-Fazzan road, Mujabra and Zawaya for traffic between Benghazi and Wadai, 
and Khababish on the Darb al-Arbacin (forty-day road) between Darfur and the 
lower Nile. 
A major dynamic of nineteenth century desert history was the ebb and flow 
of trade on these routes. Much further research will be necessary before the 
detail or even an outline of this process can be completed, but shifts in 
trade can be presumed to have. affected the constant themes in desert history 
of migration and warfare. Control of a trade route, with the revenue it 
brought from tolls and services, was a considerable prize and was subject to 
challenge from nomadic rivals. The concentration of wealth in lineages, 
segments, or whole tribes often upset the normal course of affairs in local 
politics, which depended on roughly equal distribution of power among segments 
at a given level in the structure. Weal thy groups were likely to maintain 
their positions, but an element of instability came from the ease with which 
even large caravans fell prey to raiders lying in ambush. Finally the decline 
of a once-active trade route required readjustment. The paucity of historical 
material on this issue does not permit conclusions; some groups, such as 
Chaamba, responded to a decline in the trade they carried by increasing their 
commitment to desert-edge regional trade or by raiding wealthy neighbors, 
while others such as the Khababish of the desert Nile, who took the decline of 
the forty-day route in stride by turning to nearly exclusive reliance on 
animal husbandry, seem to have adjusted more easily.21 
A prominent overall pattern in the shifting location and volume of trade 
through the the desert was the movement of trade away from the French in 
Algeria, a major irony because it so thoroughly frustrated imperial economic 
objectives. In the early days of the French occupation trade picked up; after 
1833 caravan traffic between Fez and Tlemcen began again, and British product 
imported through the Moroccan port of Tetouan entered western Algeria. Trade 
between Tetouan and Abd al-Qadir's domains increased after 1837 and especially 
after 1839 when the need for arms assured a lively commerce. But trade 
declined after the fall of Abd al-Qadir' s state, a result in part of the 
prohibitive import duties on trans-Saharan products in transit from the 
Western Sudan and restrictions on goods entering Algeria from neighboring 
territories. The French tried to remedy both situations in the 1850 's and 
1860 's, but trade failed to respond. 22 Another factor was the collapse of 
Algerian demand for slaves; while this is often cited as an explanation for 
Algerian commercial difficulties, it needs to be reevaluated in light of 
recent evidence that the Algerian slave trade was never important compared 
with other North African receiving areas.23 A final consideration was that 
the Algerian territory did not offer an advantage in terms of security for 
caravans, since at any given time hostility between the French and one or 
another group in Saharan Algeria threatened the safety of commerce. 
The route west of Algeria prospered until the late 1870s, when it began 
its final decline, and it shifted westward in Morocco during the course of the 
nineteenth century. As the importance of Figuig, located near the Algerian 
border, declined, Abeu Am, situated about 240 km southwest of Figuig, pros-
pered, and Abeu Am took over most slave trade entering Morocco. Most other 
commerce shifted even farther west toward the Atlantic coast, a consequence of 
the founding of the port of Mogador, which from its strategic location took 
over an increasing share of trans-Saharan trade after thel840s. 24 A way 
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station for the route to Mogador grew up at Tindouf, the site of an ancient 
qsar, when an alliance centering on the Tadjakant was victorious over the 
Regibat at midcentury. An enlarged alliance defended the oasis until 1884 
when Regibat won out once again. 25 Declining trade was without doubt a 
factor in this struggle, because by this time trade to Mogador was in its 
final decline, having reached a peak in 1878. It ended altogether shortly 
after the arrival of the French in Timbuctu in 1894 and the opening of a 
combination of river and overland routes between Timbuctu and St.-Louis at the 
mouth of the Senegal.26 
Trade on the route between Tripoli and Kano increased after mid-century, 
especially after the success of Ottoman efforts to keep peace south of 
Ghadames after 1850. The next thirty years represent the golden age of 
commerce on this route, and a boom in ostrich feather exports in the 1870s 
pushed the value of trade to what must have been a record high. Trade 
suffered a temporary decline during the depression of the 1880s but recovered 
with rising exports of tanned goat skins in the 1890s. Ajjer · Tuareg ran 
caravans between Ghadames and Iferuan, a resting place in the Air mountains, 
and Tuareg of the Kel Ewey confederation carried trade between Iferuan and 
Kano. Both groups encountered challenges from their neighbors; in the north 
the Ajjer beat off attacks from Chaamba and from Ahaggar Tuareg, and in the 
south Kel Ewey encountered a challenge from the Imezureg of Damergu, a 
semi-sedentary Tuareg group with a localized power base and the ability to 
profit from the taxation of ostrich feather trade from their area. 
Tripoli-Kano trade lasted longer than trade to Mogador because Kano was better 
protected from competing maritime routes, but cheap maritime freight rates 
along with growing insecurity on the desert portions of the route combined to 
bring about a sharp decline in trade after 1900. The British in Nigeria 
sought to deflect Tripoli-Kano toward the port of Lagos, while the French in 
Niger attempted to keep the desert route open. The final blow to the old 
route occurred when the railway arrived in Kano in 1911.27 
By the turn of the century the Benghazi-Wadai route was more vital than 
any other, This direct route between Cyrenaica and Wadai had been discovered 
early in the century, and Wadai sultans, whose state had grown increasingly 
powerful after the mid-eighteenth century, were anxious to promote a route 
which bypassed Borno to the west and Darfur to the east. From 1860 the 
fortunes of the trade route were intertwined with those of the Sanusiyya, a 
Muslim brotherhood which spread among the beduin of Cyrenaica after 1843 and 
later extended southward along the trade route. The success of the order had 
a great impact on trade, since a single organization spanned the entire length 
of the route, providing merchants with a common legal, social, and commercial 
framework and even a postal system. The leaders of the order strove to 
promote trade by maintaining peace along the route, and to this end they 
mediated disputes between lineages, segments, or whole tribes and often 
successfully appealed for the return of merchandise stolen in raids on cara-
vans. Trade in turn benefitted the leadership of the Sanusiya by bringing 
revenue from tolls, payment for storage space, and gifts form merchants, as 
well as lending an element of unity to far-flung Sanusi domains.28 
Banghazi-Wadai trade lasted past the turn of the century because of the 
Sanusiyya and because the route served areas more remote than the southern 
termini of Tripoli-Kano trade. The easternmost route, the Darb al-ArbaCin, 
declined after mid-century with the rise of Benghazi-Wadai trade and the 
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formation of the far-ranging trading post empire of the Jalaba. After 1885, 
the Mahdist state in the Sudan disrupted the Darb al-ArbaCin and the Nile 
routes as well. 
Trans-Saharan slave trade also affected the lives of nomadic people in a 
variety of ways. Saharan societies near the West African Sahel raided Su-
danese populations for slaves, and occasional trans-Saharan slave raids have 
been recorded, as in the case of the Awlad Sulayman before they moved to the 
Chad basin and Bani Muhammad in the early twentieth century. Nomads traded 
some slaves on their own account, just as they handled small quantities of 
other trans-Saharan products, but by and large they were transporters rather 
than financeers. Transit trade in slaves probably brought nomads less revenue 
than other forms of commerce because merchants did not have to pay for trans-
port, although they did pay tolls. Perhaps the most important impact of slave 
trade was the ready supply of slave labor, which became an important factor 
during times of expansion, especially on the desert edge, where labor could be 
used not only for herding but also in agriculture and in cottage industries. 
A case in point is that of the Kel Ewey who expanded throughout the nineteenth 
century, a time of good climate in region, prosperity from trans-Saharan and 
regional trade, and growing investments in economy of the entire region 
centering on the corridor from the Air Mountains to Kano. 29 Other cases of 
expansion also suggest the need for additional slave labor, such as the 
introduction of cultivation in Ahaggar, and the imperialism of the Ait Atta, a 
group which had been on the move in the Pre-Saharan fringe of Morocco since 
the seventeenth century. In the nineteenth century, the Ait Kabbash, a 
segment of the Ait Atta, led the desert vanguard of this expansion by exten-
ding their influence over trade between Tafilalt and Tuat and extorting 
protection money from the inhabitants of Tuat.30 
Little is known about the effect of slave trade on social stratification 
in the Sahara, except among the Tuareg. Nor is much information available on 
other aspects of trans-Saharan slave trade. Nevertheless Ralph Austen has 
compiled preliminary estimates of the movement of slaves across the desert, 
and these estimates, based on a wide variety of sources, offer some sur-
prises. According to Austen, the commerce in human beings, far from declining 
in the nineteenth century, was actually on the rise; a greater volume of trade 
reached receiving areas in North Africa and the Middle East than in any 
previous century. Austen's figures show that between 1800 and 1880 something 
on the order of half a million slaves entered Egypt and a quarter of a million 
were taken to Morocco. Few entered Algeria after the French conquest, but 
Algeria had never been as important a market as other areas. 31 In Libya the 
Benghazi-Wadai route continued to provide slaves to Egypt and other areas in 
the Middle East into the late nineteenth century, because this route was less 
easily monitored by European abolitionists than the Tripoli-Kano route. 
Farther east the Nile routes continued to carry slaves even into the early 
twentieth century.32 
Firearms trade into and across the desert also continued despite attempts 
by European powers to stop it. At Tripoli and especially at Benghazi a lively 
firearms trade was reported in the early 1880s, and many smuggled rifles, 
especially eighteen-shot Winchester repeaters, were imported for use by 
caravan escorts. But some of these modern weapons must have reached other 
nomadic groups as well, allowing them to mount successful raids because 
firepower added to the tactical advantages of surprise which raiding parties 
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already enjoyed.33 The penetration of modern repeaters into the desert 
seems to have been greatest along the Bengbazi-Wadai route, but other areas 
were affected as well; Smaldone bas assembled evidence to show that a turning 
point in the spread of firearms occured among Abaggar Tuareg in the 1890s. To 
the northwest in Morocco, contraband sales of the 1860 model single-shot 
Remington breach loader were so great that by the end of the century it bad 
become the basic rifle for many tribes throughout the country, including 
pre-Saharan nomads. Although the evidence is far from complete, increased 
insecurity on the Tripoli-Kano route after 1898 may have been due to the 
spread of firearms to raiders.34 
The region surrounding the southern terminus of the Tripoli-Kano trade 
route provides an example of the economic, political, and religious influence 
of desert people on the Sudan. In the savanna the nineteenth century marked 
the culmination of a process in which the centralization of state structures, 
Islamization, and economic growth were closely intertwined. The jihad of the 
early nineteenth century, although only a final stage in this longer process, 
resulted in the. formation of the Sokoto Caliphate, a large state which pro-
moted economic growth in its center near Kano, Katsina, and Zaria (and around 
its secondary center in the Sokoto-Rima valley) and relocated population from 
beyond its borders toward the center through slave raiding. In the center of 
the region rich farmland permitted production for the market on slave estates 
or by peasants, and this surplus production encouraged the growth of urban 
centers and craft production.35 Kano and neighboring towns developed a 
cottage textile industry which supplied cloth to a large area of the Central 
Sudan and Tuareg country to the north. Economic growth in the desert, es-
pecially in the corridor between Zinder and Air massif, which was dominated by 
Kel Ewey Tuareg, complemented the development of the savanna. Tuareg traded 
dates and salt form Bilma and Facbi, animals, and animal products for grain 
and manufactured articles form the Sudan. The Kel Ewey and their allies 
maintained an elaborate commercial network in the savanna which included urban 
centers of craftsmen and trade specialists, most of servile origin, and rural 
estates worked by slaves or their descendants. These estates, located 
throughout the Sabel and savanna, provided a proportion of the grain needed by 
desert nomads, served as resting places for transbumant Tuareg during the dry 
season, and functioned as places of refuge during drougbt.36 
Although peaceful economic exchange was the predominant mode of inter-
action between Tuareg and their sedentary neighbors, at least in the Kano-Air 
corridor, the economic strength of the noble Tuareg rested on their possession 
of camels and firearms and their mobility. Tuareg were either powerful allies 
of sedentary states, valued for their aid in military campaigns against 
enemies as for their economic potential, as was the case in relations between 
Damagaram, a state formed north of the Caliphate in the early nineteenth 
century and increasingly powerful and troublesome by the end; or Tuareg could 
be devastating enemies, as witnessed by the destruction they wrought in Borno 
in the early nineteenth century. 
The southern Sahara also served as a reservoir of Islamic learning which 
bad a continuing impact on the savanna over the centuries and particularly 
during the nineteenth century. 37 A number of desert-edge regions, including 
the Central Sudan, the Senegal basin, the interior delta of the Niger, and the 
Chad basin, supplied grain to neighboring desert people, and these economic 
ties fostered the exchange of ideas. Characteristic of southern Saharan 
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societies was a division into warrior and saintly lineages, the first aspiring 
to warfare and politics, the second having an ideology of pacificism, exper-
ience in commerce,. and a shared intellectual tradition, Like the segmentary 
structure itself the bipartite division was a model of society rather than a 
description of reality, so that only the holiest of holy men actually re-
frained from fighting, and warrior lineages engaged in commerce, though they 
were less specialized in this activity than the clerical lineages, Never-
theless the zawiya clerical lineages of Mauritania and inislimin among the 
Tuareg mastered the two politically useful sciences of fiqh (jurisprudence) 
and tasawwuf (mysticism). Like the Sanusiyya or Moroccan clerical lineages, 
they performed the valuable function of mediation and arbitration, and their 
activities had economic, political, and scholarly aspects, They maintained 
and developed Islamic scholarship over the centuries and their influence 
extended south of the desert where Saharan scholarship affected both the 
quietist tradition and the spread of Islam by militant reformers. 
IV. Conclusion 
Above all, the history of nomads is a history of fluidity, as Cordell has 
pointed out in his introduction to the story of the Awlad Sulayman: 
Nomads needed space to move int he event of an natural 
disaster, and space for their herds; they also required 
room for political maneuvering, and took advantage of 
situations that would afford a broader range of economic 
choices.38 
Herds might increase rapidly in good years, but drought and disease could also 
bring rapid decline; for this reason nomads often diversified their activities 
beyond pastoral nomad ism to include trade and ancillary services to traders, 
raiding and warfare, and the taxation or subjugation of agriculturalists, 
The nineteenth century was a time of dramatic change in the desert. The 
French occupation of Algeria shattered the economic unity of North Africa by 
deflecting trans-Saharan trade routes east and west of Algeria and by dis-
rupting east-west caravan traffic along the northern fringe of the Sahara. 
The importance of long-distance trade in the life of all nomads suggests the 
need for further research on the effect of these shifts in commerce; what was 
the effect of the formation of the state ruled by Abd al-Qadir astride a major 
east-west route? How did desert people react to shifts in commerce and what 
was the relationship between resistance and the need for readjustment? The 
French occupation of the desert also introduced a new element into the rela-
tionship between desert people and the outside world. The mobility of the 
nomads allowed a number of options in resistance which might coalesce around 
religious leaders amd Muslim orders, but the arid environment often limited 
the freedom of groups or individuals with shared resources and interests by 
presenting a choice between resistance and survival. In the Algerian desert 
the advance of the French army was a direct and immediate manifestation of the 
impact of Europe, a presence more remote if no less real elsewhere because of 
the shifting volume and composition of trans-Saharan trade. By the end of the 
century trans-Saharan trade, with the revenue and ready supply of slave labor 
it brought, had all but collapsed, despite continuing strength on the 
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Benghazi-Wadai route. A subject for further research is the uneven and 
dissimilar effect of European economic penetration on the regional economies 
at the fringe of the desert; in pre-Saharan Morocco where trans-Atlas and 
trans-Saharan economic links were shaken to their foundations; in Algeria 
where the activities of the French were predominant; north of the Senegal 
basin where gum exports increased the stakes in competition among Moorish 
groups; north of the Niger bend; in the Sokoto Caliphate where economic 
strength must be seen in light of the end of the Atlantic slave trade as well 
as Islamization and centralization within the region; in the Chad basin; and 
to the east where the expansion of Wadai transformed both the desert to its 
north and the forest to its south. Another task for researchers is, as 
Charles Stewart has suggested, to provide detail on religious ties between the 
southern Sahara and West and Central Africa seen within the theme of reli-
gious, political, and economic unity in these desert-edge regions.39 
A theme which runs throughout Saharan history is the all-pervasive in-
fluence of climate, as the pressures of drought or overpopulation drove nomads 
from arid regions and attracted them to more fertile regions on the desert 
margins or toward higher and better watered land. Existing climatic data 
permits only the most general conclusions about the ninteenth century: little 
more can be said than that the century did not witness catastophes such as 
those of the middle seventeenth and eighteenth centuries or the Sahelian 
droughts of 1911-1914 and 1969-1973; that the early nineteenth century, 
despite the absence of severe drought except in the Chad basin in the 1830s, 
was drier on the average than the period 1600-1800; and that moist conditions 
returned between 1870 and 1895 but deteriorated toward the end of the century 
and culminated in the drought of the early twentieth century.40 These 
general statements obviously mask a plethora of local and regional variation. 
Detailed data on climate would permit a better understanding of many aspects 
of human ecology and especially relationships between scarcity and such 
factors as warfare, migration, and social stratification, but unfortunately 
data at this level of detail is almost non-existant. 
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